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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
located enterprises are never nuisances per se32 and the com-
mencement of their operations cannot be prevented for fear that
they will become nuisances. 33 On the other hand, if the occu-
pant of neighboring land fails to protest the establishment of an
enterprise, this failure to protest may be used against him in
subsequent litigation.
Conclusion
None of the foregoing factors can be described as ordinarily
conclusive. The weight of each in the balancing process in any
given nuisance case varies with the presence or absence of the
others. In no other area of the law do the implications of the
decisions seem more difficult to trace.
Billy H. Hines
Separation of the Jury in Criminal Trials
The common law system of criminal procedure, which was
adopted in the Territory of Orleans by the Crimes Act of 1805,1
requires that there be no separation of the jury during a crim-
inal trial.2 This rule was adopted by the Louisiana Supreme
Court for the first time in 1844 in the case of State v. Hornsby,3
and, with little change, is now included in Article 394 of the
Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure of 1928:
"From the moment of the acceptance of any juror until
the rendition of verdict or the entry of a mistrial, as the
case may be, the jurors shall be kept together under the
charge of an officer in such a way as to be secluded from
all outside communication; provided that in cases not capi-
tal the judge may, in his discretion, permit the jurors to
separate at any time before the actual delivery of his
charge."
The object of this comment is to present an analysis of the
32. Canone v. Pailet, 160 La. 159, 106 So. 730 (1926); New Orleans v.
Lenfant, 126 La. 455, 52 So. 575 (1910); cf. Frederick v. Brown Funeral Homes,
Inc., 222 La. 57, 62 So.2d 100 (1952); Graver v. Lepine, 161 La. 97, 108 So. 138(1926); Hill v. Battalion Washington Artillery of City of New Orleans, 143
La. 533, 78 So. 844 (1918).
33. Frederick v. Brown Funeral Homes, Inc., 222 La. 57, 62 So.2d 100
(1952); Bell v. A. Riggs & Bro., 38 La. Ann. 555 (1886).
1. La. Acts 1805, c. 50, § 33, p. 440.
2. 1 CHITTY, CRIMINAL LAW 632 et seq. (1819).
. 8 Rob. 554 (La. 1844).
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Louisiana jurisprudence in an effort to determine what jury
separations constitute sufficient ground for setting aside a con-
viction.
Non-Capital Cases
The Louisiana Supreme Court has continually applied the
following rule from State v. Hornsby: "In cases not capital,
courts may, in their discretion, permit the jury to disperse until
they have received the charge of the court."'4 There have been
ten appeals from convictions in non-capital cases wherein a
reversal of the conviction was urged on grounds of a jury sepa-
ration before the judge had given his charge to the jury.5 The
fact situations involved ranged from one juror's making a visit
to the men's room unaccompanied by an officer, to complete
dispersal of the jury overnight. All ten convictions were affirmed.
The most recent of these cases, State v. Williams,6 involved an
extreme situation in which twenty-eight hours elapsed between
the close of the argument and the delivery of the charge. Dur-
ing that time one of the jurors was sworn in for the trial of a
second case. The court, citing Article 394 of the Code of Crimi-
nal Procedure, affirmed the conviction, observing that the de-
fendant had failed to show how he suffered a disadvantage from
this unusual sequence of events.
In three non-capital cases the appeals were based on a sepa-
ration of the jury after the trial judge had given his charge to
the jury. The Supreme Court set aside the conviction in State
v. Populus 7 because the jurors were allowed to return to their
homes overnight. In the other two cases the convictions were
affirmed, the court finding that the accused could not have been
prejudiced by the incidents which took place. In State v. Sims8
the jurors were leaving the courtroom for the jury room when
one of them "diverged for the purpose of getting his hat" about
fifteen feet from the jury box; he then rejoined the other jurors.
In State v. Smith9 the jurors were retiring for deliberations when
4. Id. at 559.
5. State v. Williams, 192 La. 713, 189 So. 112 (1939); State v. Wells, 168
La. 925, 123 So. 621 (1929); State v. Robichaux, 165 La. 497, 115 So. 728 (1928);
State v. Spurling, 115 La. 789, 40 So. 167 (1906); State v. Baudoin, 115 La.
773, 40 So. 42 (1905); State v. Antoine, 52 La. Ann. 488, 26 So. 1011 (1900);
State v. Magee, 48 La. Ann. 901, 19 So. 933 (1896); State v. Pierre, 38 La.
Ann. 91 (1886); State v. Dubois, 24 La. Ann. 309 (1872); State v. Crosby,
4 La. Ann. 434 (1349).
6. 192 La. 713, 189 So. 112 (1939).
7. 12 La. Ann. 710 (1857).
8. 117 La. 1036, 42 So. 494 (1906).
9. 156 La. 818, 101 So. 209 (1924).
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some of them stopped in the courtroom to get a drink of water
while the remainder of the group left the courtroom in the cus-
tody of a deputy. The courtroom door then slammed shut but
was immediately opened. In both the latter cases all jurors were
constantly in the presence of either the court or a sworn deputy,
and the separations were brief.
An analysis of the cases indicates that a separation of the
jury before the charge has been delivered is not sufficient
grounds for setting aside a conviction. Convictions will be re-
versed for separations occurring after the charge to the jury
only upon a clear showing that one or more jurors passed from
the surveillance of the court or its sworn deputies, thereby
raising the possibility of outside influence upon the jurors.
Capital Cases
Separation of the jury has been urged in appeals from capi-
tal convictions much more often than appeals from non-capital
convictions. The cases have presented widely varied fact sit-
uations, one of the most unusual of which was as follows: The
jury began their deliberations late on a Saturday night. The
trial judge waited for the verdict until one-thirty on Sunday
morning, then adjourned his court until Monday. At six o'clock
Sunday morning the jurors emerged from the jury room, handed
the clerk of court a sealed verdict, then separated and went to
their homes. On Monday morning the court convened, the jury
was polled, and then the sealed verdict was opened. The Su-
preme Court set aside the conviction on grounds of a separation
of the jury during the course of the trial, taking the position
that "the trial is not closed until the delivery and reading of
the verdict in open court and the discharge of the jury."'10
In State v. Warren" and State v. Moss 12 the convictions were
set aside because of the jurors' visits to the rest room. In those
cases it was found that although the jurors being conducted to
the rest room were in the custody of a sworn deputy, those left
behind in the court house were completely unsupervised and
therefore exposed to outside influence. The Supreme Court has
consistently held that one or more jurors may separate from
the group to visit the rest room as long as all twelve jurors are
kept under the supervision of the court or sworn deputies. This
10. State v. Hornsby, 32 La. Ann. 1268, 1269 (1880).
11. 43 La. Ann. 828, 9 So. 559 (1891).
12. 47 La. Ann. 1514, 18 So. 507 (1895).
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rule is apparently applicable to separations occurring either be-
fore13 or after 14 the charge to the jury.
In State v. Foster15 the conviction was reversed because of
the manner in which the jurors had been housed overnight
during the course of the trial. Ten white and two colored jurors
had been selected and were given quarters in a deputy's home
near the court house. The white jurors occupied one room, the
colored jurors the kitchen, and the deputy slept in a third room.
No officer slept with either jury group and the doors of the
house remained unlocked. In State v. Walters16 the conviction
was set aside because of an erroneous charge to the jury, and
the court discussed in detail the manner in which the jury had
been housed. The twelve jurors were assigned to three uncon-
nected hotel suites opening into a common hallway. The suite
doors were locked and the only deputy in charge slept outside
in the hallway. The court criticized the use of separate rooms
and pointed out that all the jurors were "out of the presence,
sight, and hearing of the deputy sheriff. 1 7 In State v. Spears,8
decided the same year as the Walters case, the jurors retired to
two hotel rooms opening into and separated by a common hall-
way. The doors were locked and one deputy sheriff slept in
each room. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, point-
ing out that the jurors had been continuously under the super-
vision of a deputy sheriff.
In State v. Carriere"9 and State v. Fuller20 the alleged jury
separations occurred in public restaurants. In the first case the
jurors dined at three tables on one side of the restaurant. Other
patrons were seated on the other side of the room. The Court
affirmed the conviction, finding that the jury had not been sepa-
rated, since they had been kept apart from other persons and
13. State v. Sharbino, 194 La. 709, 194 So. 756 (1940); State v. Washington,
169 La. 595, 125 So. 629 (1930); State v. Reed, 149 La. 175, 88 So. 783 (1921);
State v. Gunn, 147 La. 373, 85 So. 44 (1920); State v. Bullock, 136 La. 167,
66 So. 767 (1914); State v. Callian, 109 La. 346, 33 So. 363 (1903); State v.
Veillon, 105 La. 411, 29 So. 883 (1901); State v. Scanlan, 52 La. Ann. 2058,
28 So. 211 (1900); State v. Bellow, 42 La. Ann. 586, 7 So. 782 (1890); State
v. Nockum, 41 La. Ann. 689, 6 So. 729 (1889); State v. Forney, 24 La. Ann.
191 (1872).
14. State v. Johnson, 30 La. Ann. 921 (1878); State v. Turner, 25 La. Ann.
573 (1873).
15. 45 La. Ann. 1176, 14 So. 180 (1893).
16. 135 La. 1070, 66 So. 364 (1914).
17. 135 La. 1070, 1105, 66 So. 364, 376 (1914).
18. 134 La. 483, 64 So. 385 (1914).
19. 141 La. 136, 74 So. 792 (1917).
20. 218 La. 872, 51 So.2d 305 (1951).
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had had no communication with them. In the second case three
deputies conducted the jury to a crowded cafe where ten jurors
sat at one table with no outsiders, and two jurors sat in a booth
with outsiders. One of the outsiders was a grand juror who had
indicted the defendant, and during the course of the meal one
of the two trial jurors conversed with the grand juror. On a
motion for a new trial the parties involved testified that they
did not know each other's status and that their conversation
had had no reference to the trial. The conviction was affirmed.
In three instances the reversal of a conviction has been
urged on the ground that the jury was allowed to attend public
entertainment. In State v. Oteri2' the jury sat on reserved
benches ten feet from other spectators, in the custody of a dep-
uty who was a prosecution witness. The court affirmed the con-
viction, ruling that a prosecution witness can also serve as a
bailiff, and that the evidence indicated no jury separation or
communication with outside persons. In State v. Clary22 the
jury attended two picture shows with the permission of the
judge and in the custody of bailiffs. The jurors were seated in
the audience with the rows of seats in front of and behind them
occupied by outsiders. The Supreme Court affirmed the con-
viction, finding no evidence of communication between the jurors
and outsiders. The court further pointed out that defense coun-
sel, knowing of the visits to the movies, should not have delayed
his objections until after the verdict was returned. But in the
similar case of State v. Ledet 23 defense counsel was not guilty
of laches, since he first learned after the murder conviction that
the jury had attended a motion picture during the course of the
trial. The jurors had been in the custody of a deputy and had
been together at all times. The rows of movie seats immediately
in front of and behind the jurors had been occupied by out-
siders. The state's evidence indicated that there had been no
attempt by outsiders to communicate with the jury, and the
defendant offered no evidence to the contrary. The Supreme
Court affirmed this conviction also, stating that "the rule re-
quiring the isolation of a jury against improper influences does
not appear to preclude the allowance of recreation and exercise
to the jury .... "24
21. 128 La. 939, 55 So. 582 (1911).
22. 136 La. 589, 67 So. 376 (1915).
23. 211 La. 769, 30 So.2d 830 (1947).
24. 211 La. 769, 780, 30 So.2d 830, 833 (1947).
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One consistent point can be noted in all the Louisiana jury
separation cases 25-convictions are set aside only in instances
where one or more jurors have passed out of surveillance of the
court or its sworn deputies, thereby possibly exposing them to
influence from outsiders. Though there be a physical separation
of the jury, even for a period of several hours, a conviction
will nonetheless be upheld if all jurors were constantly super-
vised by a deputy who can testify that they have had no out-
side contacts sufficient to prejudice their verdict. In view of
this, the selection of mixed juries should cause no apprehension
among Louisiana district attorneys, even though it be necessary
for such juries to separate for sleeping and other purposes dur-
ing the course of the trial. It is submitted that our Supreme
Court would sustain a conviction made by such a separated jury
if the requirement of constant supervision by deputies had been
observed.
Charles W. Darnall, Jr.
Recovery for Mental Suffering in Louisiana
The weight of authority at early common law' considered
mental suffering, not accompanied by any other element of
actual damage, insufficient grounds for a recovery of damages. 2
The statement in the famous case of Lynch v. Knight,3 that
"[m]ental pain or anxiety the law cannot value, and does not
pretend to redress, when the unlawful act complained of causes
that alone," was the generally accepted rule. In the absence of
competent medical knowledge in the field, mental pain was re-
garded merely as a state of mind or feelings, hidden in the inner
25. The cases discussed present the most frequently urged types of jury
separations. The situations not presented add little to the pattern.
1. The growth of the law regarding mental suffering at common law
may be traced through the following articles: Bohlen, Right to Recover for
Injury Resulting from Negligence Without Impact, 50 U. OF PA. L. REV. 141
(1902); Goodrich, Emotional Disturbance as Legal Damage, 20 MICH. L. REV.
497 (1922); Green, "Fright" Cases, 27 ILL. L. REV. 761 (1933); Hallen, Damages
for Physical Injuries Resulting from Fright or Shock, 19 VA. L. REV. 253
(1933); Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts,
49 HARV. L. REV. 1033 (1936); Throckmorton, Damages for Fright, 34 HARV.
L. REV. 260 (1921), 57 AM. L. REV. 828 (1923); Wade, Tort Liability for Abu-
sive and Insulting Language, 4 VAND. L. REV. 63 (1950); Comment, Fright or
Nervous Shock as a Basis for the Recovery of Damages, 12 TULANE L. REV.
272 (1938).
2. Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896).
3. 9 H.L. Cas. 577, 598 (1861).
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